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I.   INTRODUCTION 
“You destroy my country, I’ll kill you. And that’s a legitimate thing. If you 
destroy our young children, I’ll kill you.”1 
Since his assumption of the office of the President on June 
30, 2016, Rodrigo Duterte has waged a bitter campaign against 
suspected drug users and distributors throughout the Philippines. 
State-sanctioned violence, stemming from both Filipino police and 
bands of armed vigilantes, has led to the deaths of approximately 
6,000 men, women, and children, as well as the arrest or surrender of 
one million more.2 As the body count continues to rise, Duterte also 
continues to stand in defiance of requests from leaders throughout 
the international community, as well as from his own Filipino people, 
to cease the bloodshed.3 
This Comment will address Duterte’s antidrug campaign in 
three parts. The first part will provide a brief overview of the harsh 
methods, carried out by Filipino police and State-sanctioned 
vigilantes in order to satisfy Duterte’s desire to cleanse his nation of 
illegal drugs. This part will primarily rely upon first-hand accounts 
and news reports in order to succinctly convey the suffering endured 
by the Filipino people over the course of the past several months. 
The second part will establish the foundation of applicable 
International Human Rights Law (“IHRL”), focusing on the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Universal Declaration”) 
and the International Convention for Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”). This part will also briefly analyze how Duterte’s methods 
                                                 
 1 Rodrigo Duterte interview: Death, Drugs and Diplomacy, ALJAZEERA (Oct. 16, 
2016, 13:06 GMT), http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2016 
/10/exclusive-rodrigo-duterte-war-drugs-161015100325799.html. 
 2 Martial Law Eyed in War on Drugs, INQUIRER.NET (Jan. 156, 2016, 12:14 
AM), http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/862468/martial-law-eyed-in-war-on-drugs. 
 3 Full Text: Sen. Leila de Lima Privilege Speech on Drugs, Killings, 
INQUIRER.NET (Aug. 2, 2016), 6:51 PM http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/802151/full-
text-leila-de-lima-privilege-speech-drugs-killings 
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are in clear violation of many of these key principles of international 
law. 
Finally, the third part will outline several potential courses of 
action that the international community can, and should, pursue in 
order to end the violence in the Philippines. This part will first 
explore mediation and arbitration, two of the least confrontational 
methods available between Duterte and various representatives from 
the international community. mediation and arbitration between 
Duterte and various representatives from the international 
community. 
This part will then progress to a discussion of two options for 
possible adjudication should mediation and arbitration fail. The first 
of these options is the involvement, either through trial or through an 
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”). The 
second of these options involves the prosecution of Duterte by the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”). 
This part, and ultimately this Comment, will then conclude by 
recommending United Nations Security Council intervention under 
its Article VII powers, should all alternative means of resolution 
prove ineffective. While each of these proposed methods for 
resolution have their own potential difficulties, as will be discussed 
later in this Comment, the international community must take some 
sort of action to put an end to the violence in the Philippines. Too 
many Filipinos have been unjustly deprived of life and liberty for the 
rest of the world to sit idly by. 
II.  DUTERTE’S METHODS 
Like many nations around the world, the Philippines has long 
struggled with the issue of drug abuse. Out of approximately one 
hundred million Filipino citizens, upwards of 1.3 million are drug 
users.4 This is a tremendous figure, and serves as the primary reason 
                                                 
 4 Euan McKirdy, Duterte’s Crackdown: 6 Stories from the Frontlines, CNN (Sept. 
3, 2016, 11:20 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/28/asia/philippines-voices-
drugs-war/. 
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why Duterte based his campaign on his desire to cleanse the country 
of its drug troubles.5 However, instead of bringing about an end to 
the plethora of violence and untold horrors that stem from drug 
abuse, Duterte has only made things significantly worse through his 
open acceptance of vigilante and extrajudicial killings. 
“If (a criminal) fights, and he fights to the death, you can kill 
him . . . Please feel free to call us, the police, or do it yourself if you 
have the gun . . . you have my support.”6 This quote, originating from 
a speech given by Duterte during the beginning stages of his drug 
crackdown, is a fairly representative sample of Duterte’s willingness 
to encourage state-sanctioned violence towards suspected drug 
abusers. Lawyers and scholars across the globe should be able to 
identify this rhetoric as condoning clear violations of fundamental 
principles of due process. However, what has been the actual physical 
and emotional impact of Duterte’s open hostility towards drug 
offenders on the people of the Philippines? 
Simply stated, Duterte’s antidrug campaign has had an almost 
indescribably deleterious impact on countless thousands of Filipino 
citizens. Indeed, as one Filipino citizen described, Duterte’s openly 
harsh stance towards drug users and abusers has led “the cops [to] 
feel they can act without fear of retribution, official or otherwise.”7 
This same individual was forced to stand helplessly to the side as 
police forced themselves into her home in pursuit of her brother, a 
drug user.8 The police placed her brother in handcuffs and proceeded 
to shoot her brother in the head, execution-style, alongside three 
other men.9 
In addition to storming private residences, Filipino police 
have also taken their violence to the streets. Suspected drug dealers 
have been publicly gunned down by police, with their bodies often 
                                                 
 5 Rodrigo Duterte Interview: Death, Drugs and Diplomacy, ALJAZEERA (Oct. 16, 
2016, 13:06 GMT), http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2016/ 
10/exclusive-rodrigo-duterte-war-drugs-161015100325799.html. 
 6 McKirdy, supra note 4. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
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left out in the open to rot and serve as an ominous warning to other 
drug dealers in the area.10 Indeed, one of the first images to bring 
Duterte’s antidrug campaign to international attention featured the 
lifeless body of a suspected drug pusher cradled in the arms of his 
grieving partner.11 Beside the body stood a sign stating “Drug Pusher 
Huwang Tularan,” which is translated as “I am a drug pusher, don’t 
emulate.”12 
Besides the rampant killings, jails around the Philippines have 
become inundated with inmates. For example, in September 2016, 
the Quezon City jail, which was constructed to hold approximately 
800 inmates, instead housed over 4,000 individuals, ranging from 
teenagers to the elderly.13 Due to the overcrowding, these prisoners 
have been forced to sleep in rotations, if they are even able to find 
some crevice to rest their weary heads in the first place.14 
From extrajudicial killings to mass incarceration, individuals 
across the Philippines are terrified for the safety of themselves and 
their families. Any potentially incriminating statement could very well 
result in a Filipino citizen staring down the barrel of an armed 
vigilante or overzealous police officer’s gun.15 After witnessing the 
death of her brother at the hands of police, as was described above, 
“Janie” (actual name withheld) felt little but despair. “My God, 
Duterte, stop doing this . . . You don’t have the right to take the lives 
of these people.”16 
                                                 
 10 Raffy Lerma, The Story Behind the Viral Photo, INQUIRER.NET (July 31, 
2016, 12:02 AM), http://opinion.inquirer.net/96101/the-story-behind-the-viral-
photo. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 McKirdy, supra note 4.  
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
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III.  APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: THE 
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
Having briefly shed light upon the horrendous traumas 
inflicted against the Filipino people, this Comment will now seek to 
establish how Duterte’s antidrug campaign directly flouts 
international law. First, this part will classify Duterte’s actions as 
falling within the scope of International Human Rights Law, as 
distinguished from International Humanitarian Law, and will explain 
the essential differences between the two. This part will then 
highlight two specific sources within the scope of International 
Human Rights Law and describe how Duterte’s crackdown is in open 
violation of many of its most basic precepts. 
Although Duterte’s crackdown on drug users in the 
Philippines has frequently been labeled a “war on drugs,” few legal 
practitioners would argue that Duterte’s actions amount to a “war” or 
“armed conflict” within the scope of International Humanitarian Law 
(“IHL”), otherwise known as the Law of Armed Conflict 
(“LOAC”).17 Under IHL, only two potential engagements can be 
classified as “armed conflicts” under international law.18 The first, an 
International Armed Conflict (“IAC”), only occurs between two or 
more States, such as the United States’ (and a whole host of other 
States’) war against Nazi Germany.19 The second, a Non-
International Armed Conflict (“NIAC”), occurs between a State and 
                                                 
 17 The core of IHL is comprised of the four Geneva Conventions, as well 
as Additional Protocols I and II. These treaties apply only during periods of armed 
conflict, and seek to (1) mitigate the pain and suffering inflicted by opposing 
armies, (2) prevent unnecessary civilian casualties, and (3) protect those individuals 
who are no longer taking part in the hostilities, including prisoners of war. See The 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE 
OF THE RED CROSS (Jan. 1, 2014), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/geneva-
conventions-1949-additional-protocols. (providing an introduction to these 
treaties). 
 18 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). 
 19 Id. 
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some organized group, such as the United States’ long-running battle 
against the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization.20 
Duterte’s drug campaign is neither an IAC against a foreign 
State nor a NIAC against some organized drug cartel or syndicate; 
rather, it is a purely internal campaign directed against individual 
persons suspected of abusing or distributing drugs. Therefore, IHL 
will not govern Duterte’s actions and policies regarding his 
crackdown on drugs. Instead, International Human Rights Law 
(“IHRL”) will serve as the legal basis for evaluating Duterte’s 
conduct in the realm of international law.21 
This distinction is key. Under IHL, a belligerent may, subject 
to limitations imposed by the Geneva Conventions, use lethal force 
to both combat enemy forces and achieve desired objectives.22 
Conversely, under IHRL, lethal force may only be used when 
absolutely necessary, i.e. in self-defense.23 Additionally, as will be 
further discussed below, suspected criminals are entitled to a host of 
                                                 
 20 Id. 
 21 Unlike IHL, which applies only during times of war, IHRL governs the 
day-to-day interactions between States and their respective citizens, and serves to 
guarantee individuals across the world certain fundamental and inalienable rights. 
See The Foundation of International Human Rights Law, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/foundation-international-
human-rights-law/index.html. (providing an introduction to the history and 
development of IHRL). 
 22 As outlined by the Geneva Conventions, military operations under the 
umbrella of IHL are governed by four basic principles: (a) proportionality, (b) 
distinction, (c) necessity, and (d) unnecessary suffering. Although militaries may not 
explicitly target civilians, they may legally inflict civilian casualties should they arise 
from an operation that was necessary to achieving a legitimate military objective 
and proportional to the importance of that objective. 
 23 See, e.g., Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law 
Enforcement Officials, Provision 9 (“Law enforcement officials shall not use 
firearms against persons except in self-defence or defence of others against the 
imminent threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the perpetration of a 
particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person presenting 
such a danger and resisting their authority, or to prevent his or her escape, and only 
when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these objectives. In any event, 
intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in 
order to protect life.”). 
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due process protections prior to deprivation of life or liberty, as 
specified by several IHRL treaties and declarations. 
Of those applicable IHRL sources, this Comment will 
highlight key provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (“Universal Declaration”) and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). Both sources treat due process 
with utmost sanctity, something which Duterte has openly and 
repeatedly failed to do in his campaign against suspected drug 
criminals in the Philippines. 
A.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
The Universal Declaration was proclaimed by the United 
Nations General Assembly in Paris on December 10, 1948, just a few 
years after the conclusion of the bloodiest and most costly war ever 
waged in human history.24 The United Nations has described the 
Universal Declaration as having established a “common standard of 
achievements for all peoples and all nations,” as well as established, 
“for the first time, fundamental human rights to be universally 
protected . . . “25 
The Universal Declaration established several basic 
guarantees of due process, which its signatory States agreed to extend 
to their respective citizens. Article 3 of the Universal Declaration 
states, “[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and the security of 
person.”26 The Universal Declaration features several other pertinent 
provisions, which are listed in their entirety in the notes following 
this comment.27 
                                                 
 24 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 3, Dec. 10, 1948, U.N. 
Doc. A/777 [hereinafter Universal Declaration]: (“Everyone has the right to life, 
liberty and the security of person.”). 
 27 Universal Declaration art. 5: (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”); Universal Declaration, art. 
8 (“Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national 
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution 
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The Philippines has long been party to the Universal 
Declaration, having helped craft the declaration in 1948.28 However, 
Duterte’s antidrug campaign has repeatedly violated several of the 
Universal Declaration’s most basic precepts. For example, as 
described in the preceding section of this Comment, Filipino citizens 
across the country have been denied access to the courts, in favor of 
summary executions in homes and in the streets. 
B.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
The ICCPR was adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly on December 16, 1966, almost twenty years after the 
adoption of the Universal Declaration.29 The Philippines signed the 
ICCPR on December 19, 1966, and ratified the treaty on October 23, 
1986.30 The treaty is divided into several sections, which will now be 
briefly described. 
Part II of the ICCPR establishes the responsibilities the treaty 
obligations owed by the member States.31 Part III of the ICCPR 
                                                 
or by law.”); Universal Declaration, art. 9 (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
arrest, detention or exile.”); Universal Declaration, art. 10 (“Everyone is entitled in 
full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in 
the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against 
him.”); Universal Declaration, art. 11(1) (“Everyone charged with a penal offence 
has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a 
public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.”); 
Universal Declaration, art. 12 (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference 
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor or 
reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks.”) 
 28 PHL among founding fathers of new UN Declaration on Human Rights Education 
and Training, OFFICIAL GAZETTE (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.officialgazette.gov 
.ph/2011/03/30/phl-among-founding-fathers-of-new-un-declaration-on-human-
rights-education-and-training/. 
 29 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2(1), adopted 
Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Rep. 102-23, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 
1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 30 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 
Philippines Ratification Status of Human Rights Treaties, http://tbinternet.o 
hchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=137&Lang=EN . 
 31 8070, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]: Each State Party to the 
present Covenant undertakes: 
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establishes the various due process rights guaranteed by the treaty; 
those provisions most pertinent to Duterte’s antidrug campaign are 
listed in the notes following this Comment.32 Part IV of the ICCPR 
                                                 
   (a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein 
recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the 
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity; 
   (b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right 
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, 
or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, 
and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; (c) To ensure that the competent 
authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted. ICCPR, art. 2(1).See also 
ICCPR, art. 3 (“The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the 
equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set 
forth in the present Covenant.). 
  (c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies 
when granted. 
 32 ICCPR art. 6(1): (“Every human being has the inherent right to life. This 
right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”); 
ICCPR, art. 6(2) (“In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, 
sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance 
with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary 
to the provisions of the present Covenant . . . This penalty can only be carried out 
pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court.”); ICCPR, art. 7 (“No 
one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.”); ICCPR, art. 9(1) (“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of 
person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be 
deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such 
procedure as are established by law.”); ICCPR, art. 9(2) (“Anyone who is arrested 
shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be 
promptly informed of any charges against him.”); ICCPR, art. 9(3) (“Anyone 
arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge 
or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to 
trial within a reasonable time or to release.”); ICCPR, art. 9(4) (“Anyone who is 
deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings 
before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness 
of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.”); ICCPR, art. 
9(5) (“Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have 
an enforceable right to compensation.”); ICCPR, art. 10(1) (“All persons deprived 
of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent 
dignity of the human person.”); ICCPR, art. 14(1) (“All persons shall be equal 
before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against 
him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a 
fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law.”); ICCPR, art. 14(2) (“Everyone charged with a criminal offence 
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252 
establishes a system of review of member States’ compliance with the 
treaty, with pertinent provisions listed below.33 
                                                 
shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law.”); 
ICCPR, art. 14(3) (“In the determination of any criminal charge against him, 
everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equity: (a) 
To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the 
nature and cause of the charge against him; (b) To have adequate time and facilities 
for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with counsel of his own 
choosing; (c) To be tried without undue delay; (d) To be tried in his presence, and 
to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be 
informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal 
assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and 
without payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to 
pay for it; (e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and so 
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same 
conditions as witnesses against him; (g) Not to be compelled to testify against 
himself or to confess guilt.”); ICCPR, art. 14(5) (“Everyone convicted of a crime 
shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher 
tribunal according to law.”); ICCPR, art. 17(1) (“No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, 
nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.”). 
 33 ICCPR, art. 40(1) (“The States Parties to the present Covenant 
undertake to submit reports on the measures they have adopted which give effect 
to the rights recognized herein and on the progress made in the enjoyment of those 
rights: (a) Within one year of the entry into force of the present Covenant for the 
States Parties concerned; . . . “); ICCPR, art. 41(1) (“A State Party to the present 
Covenant may at any time declare under this article that it recognizes the 
competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications to the 
effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its 
obligations under the present Covenant.”); ICCPR, art. 42(1)(a) (“If a matter 
referred to the Committee in accordance with article 41 is not resolved to the 
satisfaction of the States Parties concerned, the Committee may, with the prior 
consent of the States Parties concerned, appoint an ad hoc Conciliation 
Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission). The good offices of the 
Commission shall be made available to the States Parties concerned with a view to 
an amicable solution of the matter on the basis of respect for the present 
Covenant.”); ICCPR, art. 44 (“The provisions for the implementation of the 
present Covenant shall apply without prejudice to the procedures prescribed in the 
field of human rights by or under the constituent instruments and the conventions 
of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies and shall not prevent the 
States Parties to the present Covenant from having recourse to other procedures 
for settling a dispute in accordance with general or special international agreements 
in force between them.”). 
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When questioned about the brutality of his campaign, 
Duterte has often emphatically stated that such violent measures, 
including the potential declaration of martial law, were and are 
necessary in order to combat the Philippines’ rampant drug 
epidemic.34 It should be noted that this argument is not entirely 
without merit; in fact, the ICCPR contains such a “public 
emergency” provision in Article 4, which states: 
(1) In time of public emergency which threatens the 
life of the nation and the existence of which is 
officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present 
Covenant may take measures derogating from their 
obligations under the present Covenant to the extent 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, 
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with 
their other obligations under international law . . . 35  
As many who have witnessed the effects of illicit drugs can 
undoubtedly attest, illicit drugs have the potential to significantly 
harm communities if left unchecked. However, despite any real or 
conceived danger posed by drugs in the Philippines, Section 2 of 
Article 4 of the ICCPR contains the following caveat: “No 
derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 
18 may be made under this provision.”36 As discussed above, 
signatories to the ICCPR recognize every person’s right to life, which 
may not be deprived without adequate process. Drugs may be a 
rampant issue throughout the Philippines, but that does not give 
Duterte cart blanche to take the lives of thousands of individuals, as 
well as imprison thousands more, without providing each and every 
one of them opportunities to have their respective days in court. 
                                                 
 34 Martial Law Eyed in War on Drugs, INQUIRER.NET (Jan. 15, 2016, 12:14 
AM), http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/862468/martial-law-eyed-in-war-on-drugs. 
 35 ICCPR, art. 4. 
 36 ICCPR, art. 4(2.) 
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IV.  LEGAL RECOURSE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: 
MEDIATION, ADJUDICATION, INTERVENTION 
Duterte’s actions are clear and egregious violations of the 
above principles of IHRL. However, for the sake of the many 
thousands of Filipinos suffering from the rampant violence and 
bloodshed, it is not enough to simply recognize and acknowledge 
these violations. Rather, the international community needs to take 
affirmative action in order to bring Duterte’s crackdown to an end. 
This action may take one of three forms: (1) arbitration and 
mediation; (2) adjudication by an international court; or, in the event 
that the first two options fail, (3) intervention by the UN Security 
Council. 
A.  Mediation and Arbitration 
The first course of action that should be pursued by the 
international community should be some form of arbitration or 
mediation with Duterte. Over the past several years, mediation, or 
arbitration with a third-party arbiter, has seen a drastic increase in use 
by the international community to resolve disputes between 
international parties.37 
The primary advantage of mediation and arbitration, and 
what could potentially coerce Duterte into participating, is the 
control the parties have over the process. First, unlike with traditional 
courts, the parties, should they agree, will make the decision as to the 
individual(s) who will hear their case. For example, in order to 
incentivize Duterte to agree to arbitration, the parties may agree to 
have an arbitrator from Southeast Asia. Such an arbitrator may have 
direct knowledge of the Philippines’ drug problems, and thus may be 
viewed by Duterte as potentially sympathetic to his cause. 
Second, in addition to the parties deciding upon the 
individual who will arbitrate the dispute, the parties also have 
                                                 
 37 See, e.g., Gary Born and Wendy Miles, Global Trends in International 
Arbitration, WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP, http://www. 
wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/WilmerHale_Shared_Content/Files/Editorial/Pub
lication/GlobalTrends_InternationalArbitration.pdf. 
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significant latitude in deciding which rules will apply to their case. 
Again, to further incentivize Duterte to come to the negotiating table, 
the parties may agree to use Filipino law to govern the dispute, or any 
other law which Duterte may see as potentially advantageous to his 
position. 
However, in order for the parties to reap these advantages, 
both parties must be willing to engage in the process. Unfortunately, 
this will likely prove to be the fatal flaw for this avenue of resolution, 
due to Duterte’s ardent belief in the justness and necessity of his 
antidrug campaign. Indeed, time and time again the stubborn Duterte 
has proclaimed the righteousness of his cause, and as such he is 
unlikely to waiver from this belief.38 
B.  Adjudication 
Should the above mediation techniques fail to bring an end to 
the violence, the international community should then seek recourse 
from one of two international courts: the International Court of 
Justice (“ICJ”) or the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). 
1.  International Court of Justice.  
As established in Article 92 of the UN Charter, “The 
International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of 
the United Nations. . . .”39 It offers a forum for adjudication of a 
whole host of international issues, as outlined in the Statute for the 
International Court of Justice.40 Additionally, the Court will employ a 
                                                 
 38 Rodrigo Duterte interview: Death, Drugs and Diplomacy, ALJAZEERA (Oct. 16, 
2016, 13:06 GMT), http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera /2016 
/10/exclusive-rodrigo-duterte-war-drugs-161015100325799.html. 
 39 U.N. Charter, art. 92. 
 40 (1) The Jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties 
refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United 
Nations or in treaties and conventions in force. 
     (2) The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that 
they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation 
to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all 
legal disputes concerning: (a) the interpretation of a treaty; (b) any question of 
international law; (c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would 
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host of measures in order to reach a fair decision.41 Furthermore, 
only states may bring suits before the Court.42 
Since its inception, the ICJ has decided several influential 
cases. For example, in the Nicaragua case (referenced above), the ICJ 
established several parameters for defining armed conflict.43 More 
recently, the Court has passed judgment on a case between Croatia 
and Serbia involving the applicability of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.44 
However, before it may actually decide a case, the ICJ must 
first establish its jurisdiction over the parties, which could pose a 
significant issue regarding Duterte’s drug campaign. In order for the 
ICJ to have jurisdiction over a case, both parties must consent to 
such jurisdiction.45 Should one party refuse to recognize ICJ 
jurisdiction, the Court’s decision would be stripped of its intended 
impact, and thus rendered moot. So, should Duterte refuse to 
                                                 
constitute a breach of an international obligation; (d) the nature or extent of the 
reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation. 
     (3) The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or 
on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain states, or for a certain 
time. 
     (6) In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the 
matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court. Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, art. 36, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933 [hereinafter: 
ICJ Statute]. 
 41 The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international 
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: (a)international conventions, 
whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by contesting 
states; (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; (d) subject to the 
provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law. ICJ Statute, art. 38(1). 
 42 Only states may be parties in cases before the Court. ICJ Statute, art. 34. 
 43 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). 
 44 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, Feb. 3, 2015. 
 45 See U.N. Charter, art. 36(3) (“The declarations referred to above may be 
made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or 
certain states, or for a certain time.”). 
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consent to ICJ jurisdiction pertaining to his drug campaign, the Court 
would lack the authority necessary to issue an opinion. 
In addition to this jurisdictional concern, and as stated above, 
the ICJ has jurisdiction only over States, i.e. it may not exercise 
jurisdiction over specific individuals. Although Duterte is the 
President and leader of the Philippines, the Court may potentially not 
wish to exercise jurisdiction over the entirety of the Philippines, as to 
do so may seem as if the Court was indicting the entire country, 
Duterte and victims alike. 
As stated in Article 96 of the UN Charter, the ICJ has the 
power to do more than adjudicate cases. In fact, should the ICJ fail to 
secure jurisdiction through consent, or should the ICJ elect not to 
assert jurisdiction over the entirety of the Filipino State, the ICJ may 
instead issue an advisory opinion at the request of the General 
Assembly or the Security Council.46 
ICJ advisory opinions have addressed several important 
international issues, including the Court’s 2004 advisory opinion 
concerning the legality of an Israeli-constructed wall in Palestine.47 
However, as can be easily inferred by their name, advisory opinions 
are not binding. They are devoid of substantive legal impact, and a 
hard man like Duterte would likely view an ICJ advisory opinion with 
the same little regard as a reckless motorist views a speed limit sign 
on an empty, open-country, road. 
2.  International Criminal Court 
The ICJ is not the only international judicial body to which 
the international community may turn for a resolution to the 
Philippine humanitarian crisis. The ICC was created by the Rome 
Statute in 2002, for the purpose of prosecuting individuals suspected 
                                                 
 46 U.N. Charter, art. 96(1: )(“The General Assembly or the Security 
Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion 
on any legal question.”). 
 47 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, ICJ Advisory Opinion, July 9, 2004. 
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of perpetrating the major crimes of international criminal law.48 
These crimes, which are defined by the Rome Statute, include 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of 
aggression.49 Over the course of its nearly fifteen years of existence, 
the Court has tried several dozen cases, and currently has ten cases 
under investigation.50 
The ICC presents a significant advantage over the ICJ 
regarding its jurisdiction. Unlike the ICJ, which may only hear 
disputes between States, the ICC may only assert its authority over 
individual persons.51 Therefore, the Court would be better able to 
focus attention towards Duterte himself rather than the entirety of 
the Philippines, provided that the Court could establish requisite 
jurisdiction. 
Regarding jurisdiction, the ICC would likely be able to assert 
jurisdiction over Duterte for three reasons. First, the Philippines is 
one of the 124 States party to the Rome Statute, having ratified the 
multilateral treaty in 2011.52 Therefore, all Filipino people, including 
President Duterte, fall within the umbrella of ICC jurisdiction. 
                                                 
 48 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court [hereinafter 
Rome Statute], art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187 UNTS 3, available at: http://www.icc-
cpi.int>: (“An International Criminal Court (“the Court”) is hereby established. It 
shall be a permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction 
over persons for the most serious crimes on international concern, as referred to in 
this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The 
jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be governed by the provisions of 
this Statute.)” 
 49 The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes 
of concern to the international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in 
accordance with this Statute with respect to the following crimes: (a) The crime of 
genocide; (b) Crimes against humanity; (c) War crimes; (d) The crime of aggression. 
Rome Statute, art. 5(1). 
 50 Situations Under Investigation, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/Home.aspxhttps://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/Home 
.aspx (listing the current situations that are under investigation). 
 51 Rome Statute, art. 1. 
 52 Philippines Ratifies the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
UNITED NATIONS (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp? 
NewsID=39416#.WJ0WpvkrI2w. 
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Second, the actions committed by Philippine police and 
vigilantes, pursuant to Duterte’s dictates, can arguably constitute 
crimes against humanity, which the ICC defines as “serious violations 
committed as part of a large-scale attack against any civilian 
population.”53 According to the Rome Statute, there are several forms 
of “crimes against humanity,” which include: murder, imprisonment, 
torture, and enforced disappearance.54 The Duterte regime has 
employed such acts throughout the country, as part of a systematic 
attempt to eradicate drug use and distribution. 
Third, it is unlikely that a national court would be able to 
effectively adjudicate a case of this magnitude. As established by the 
Rome Statute, the ICC has only secondary jurisdiction, meaning that 
the Court may only exercise its jurisdiction if a national court is 
unable or unwilling to adjudicate the case.55 As Duterte is the head of 
the Filipino government, a Filipino court would likely be hard-
pressed to successfully hear a case against him concerning his grave 
affronts of international human rights law. Additionally, as Duterte’s 
antidrug campaign is largely a domestic affair, another country’s 
domestic courts would likely also exhibit great difficulty in securing 
the firebrand leader’s presence within its courts. 
Despite the ICC’s potential ability to exercise jurisdiction 
over Duterte, there are two problems associated with the Court’s 
potential action. First, the ICC has no actual authority or ability to 
carry out sentences.56 Rather, the Court is wholly reliant upon the 
                                                 
 53 How the Court Works, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-the-court-works/Pages/default.aspx#legal 
Process (last visited Nov. 19, 2016). 
 54 For the purpose of this Statute, “crime against humanity” means any of 
the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder; 
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of 
fundamental rules of international law; (f) Torture; (i) Enforced disappearance of 
persons; (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great 
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. Rome Statute, 
art. 7(1). 
 55 Rome Statute, art. 1. 
 56 Upon rendering a guilty verdict, the ICC may, under the Rome Statute, 
institute a number of potential punishments, including prison sentences, fines, and 
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international community to enforce its judgments. Therefore, while 
the ICC may find Duterte guilty of committing crimes against 
humanity, enforcement of the Court’s decision and sentence is wholly 
dependent upon either (a) Duterte’s willing cooperation, which is 
incredibly unlikely, or (b) the international community’s willingness 
to enforce the Court’s decision through potentially violent means. 
A second, and perhaps more important, concern is that it 
remains to be seen how long the Philippines will continue to remain 
party to the Rome Statute. On 16 November 2016, Russian President 
Vladimir Putin officially withdrew his country’s support of the Rome 
Statute, placing Russia outside the scope of the ICC’s jurisdiction.57 
Duterte may very well follow Russia’s path, and also elect to 
withdraw the Philippines from ICC jurisdiction, thus placing him 
outside of the Court’s ability to exercise its prosecution powers.58 
C. Intervention 
Ultimately, should arbitration, mediation, and adjudication 
each fail to effectively put an end to the rampant violence plaguing 
the Philippines, the UN Security Council should seek to take a 
proactive role in ending Duterte’s campaign. First, this section will 
briefly discuss the principle of non-intervention, and how it should 
not apply to Duterte’s actions. Next, this section will establish the 
Security Council’s authority to act, pursuant to the Charter of the 
United Nations. Finally, this section will explore possible avenues of 
Security Council action. 
                                                 
property forfeitures. See Rome Statute, art. 77. However, in order to carry out such 
punishments, the ICC is wholly dependent on the cooperation of Rome Statute 
member States. See, e.g., Rome Statute, art. 1(a) (“A sentence of imprisonment shall 
be served in a State designated by the Court from a list of States which have 
indicated to the Court their willingness to accept sentenced persons.”). 
 57 See Ivan Nechepurenko and Nick Cumming-Bruce, Russia Cuts Ties with 
International Criminal Court, Calling It ‘One Sided’, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 16, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/17/world/europe/russia-withdraws-
from-international-criminal-court-calling-it-one-sided.html. 
 58 Neil Jerome Morales and Stephanie van den Berg, Philippines’ Duterte says 
may fallow Russia’s withdrawal from ‘useless’ ICC, REUTERS (Nov. 17, 2016, 11:54 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-duterte-icc-idUSKBN13C0GS. 
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The international community has long recognized the 
principle of non-intervention, which frowns upon any effort by a 
State to compromise the sovereignty of another State. This principle 
was codified in Article 2 of the UN Charter, which states: 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall 
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters 
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of any state or shall require the Members to submit 
such matters to settlement under the present Charter, 
but this principle shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.59 
Based on the principle of non-intervention, Duterte would 
doubtlessly argue that the Philippines’ drug problem is “essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction” of the country. Therefore, Duterte 
should be able to employ whatever methods he sees fit to combat the 
nation’s drug epidemic, free from international interference. Indeed, 
as discussed above, the essentially domestic nature of Duterte’s drug 
campaign could prevent another State’s courts from exercising 
jurisdiction to hear a case concerning Duterte’s human rights abuses. 
However, the language in Article 2 does not preclude the 
involvement of the Security Council, despite the domestic nature of 
the incident. The procedures which govern potential Security Council 
involvement are listed within Chapter VII of the UN Charter. As 
stated in Article 39 of Chapter VII: 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of 
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance 
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.60 
President Duterte’s war on drugs constitutes both a threat to 
and a breach of the peace as outlined in this article. Since his 
                                                 
 59 U.N. Charter, art. 2. 
 60 U.N. Charter, art. 39. 
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assumption of the presidency, countless thousands of Philippine 
citizens have suffered at the hands of an overzealous police state. In 
addition, such rampant violence could potentially endanger 
international travelers coming to the Philippines. Furthermore, 
Duterte’s campaign could potentially influence other leaders in the 
region to begin their own violent campaigns against drugs.61 
In sum, the Security Council arguably has the authority under 
the Charter of the United Nations to initiate measures against 
Duterte. Furthermore, the Security Council has a wide latitude of 
potential options when determining how to best achieve peace. First, 
the Security Council may elect to employ nonviolent means, such as 
economic sanctions and communications interruptions, in order to 
secure stability in the country. Specifically, Article 41 states: 
The Security Council may decide what measures not 
involving the use of armed force are to be employed 
to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the 
Members of the United Nations to apply such 
measures. These may include complete or partial 
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, 
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication, and the severance of diplomatic 
relations.62 
Furthermore, the Security Council’s potential measures are 
not limited to these relatively peaceful measures. In fact, the Security 
Council has the discretion to authorize other UN member States to 
use military force to secure the peace. Specifically, Article 42 states: 
Should the Security Council consider that measures 
provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or 
have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action 
by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. 
                                                 
 61 Indonesian Anti-drugs Chief Supports Implementing Rodrigo Duterte’s Philippine-
style Drug War, ABC News (Sept. 7, 2016, 3:37 PM), http://www.abc.net.au/news 
/2016-09-08/indonesian-official-wants-philippine-style-drug-war/7824696. 
 62 U.N. Charter, art. 41. 
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Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, 
and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of 
Members of the United Nations.63 
In 2011, the Security Council intervened in Libya regarding a 
situation that was also arguably an internal matter. In response to the 
many injustices inflicted upon the Libyan people at the hands of 
notorious despot Muammar Gaddafi, the Security Council elected to 
enforce a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace and permitted U.N. 
member states, namely the United States, to participate in strategic 
bombing campaigns of Libyan military targets.64 Although Libya 
continues to face instability, Security Council involvement did 
ultimately result in the death of Gaddafi in the Libyan city of Sirte on 
October 20, 2011.65 
However, Security Council action could pose several 
significant potential problems. First and foremost, in order for the 
Security Council to be able to take action, it must receive consent, 
either explicitly or implicitly through abstention, from each of the 
permanent five members: the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, Russia, and China.66 Each of these five countries wields veto 
power, and could unilaterally impede Security Council operations 
should they choose to exercise that power.67 
                                                 
 63 U.N. Charter, art. 42. 
 64 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1973, S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
 65 Martin Asser, The Muammar Gaddafi Story, BBC NEWS (Oct. 21, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12688033. 
 66 The Security Council shall consist of fifteen members of the United 
Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States 
of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. U.N. Charter, art. 
23(1). 
 67 Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by 
an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the 
permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under 
paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. U.N. 
Charter, art. 27(3). 
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While the first three listed countries may be more receptive to 
possible Security Council action regarding the Philippines, China 
would likely oppose any potential Security Council interference with 
its newly-budding relationship with Duterte and the Philippines.68 
Additionally, as the Philippines lies relatively close to the Chinese 
mainland, Chinese officials would likely view potential military 
operations as a possible threat towards Chinese interests and Chinese 
sovereignty.69 Again, a Chinese veto would, as outlined in the U.N. 
Charter, essentially strip the Security Council of its ability to intervene 
on behalf of the embattled people of the Philippines. 
Additionally, members of the international community would 
need to consider a potential Philippine military response towards acts 
which could be perceived as attacks on Philippine sovereignty. By his 
very nature, Duterte would likely not submissively accept 
intervention by the international community; more likely, Duterte 
would actively combat any attempt by foreign States to intervene in 
the Philippines, thus leading to greater suffering by the Filipino 
people. Additionally, should one State attempt to unilaterally use 
force to stop Duterte’s drug campaign, Duterte would likely invoke 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter as a legal basis for using deadly force 
in self-defense.70 
                                                 
 68 For an insight into the Philippines’ shifting of loyalties away from the 
United States and towards China, see, for example, Ben Blanchard, Duterte Aligns 
Philippines with China, Says U.S. Has Lost, REUTERS (Oct. 20, 2016, 7:39 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-philippines-idUSKCN12K0AS. 
 69 As demonstrated by its current hostility towards any outside interference 
in the South China Sea, China is notoriously protective of its national interests and 
its borders. For an overview of China’s role in the South China Sea dispute, see, e.g., 
Howard W. French, What’s Behind Beijing’s Drive to Control the South China Sea?, THE 
GUARDIAN (July 28, 2015, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015 
/jul/28/whats-behind-beijings-drive-control-south-china-sea-hainan. 
 70 Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of 
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in exercise 
of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council 
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security 
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems 
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Despite all of these concerns, it would behoove the Security 
Council to at least attempt to take action. Too many lives and 
liberties are at stake for the member States to simply sweep Duterte’s 
lawless actions under the rug. Although this Author is admittedly 
ignorant of the optimal Security Council action necessary to stop 
further violence, those individuals from the Security Council’s 
member States with requisite experience should be called on to craft 
a workable solution. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
“Double your efforts. Triple them, if need be. We will not 
stop until the last drug lord, the last financier, and the last pusher 
have surrendered or put behind bars -- or below the ground, if they 
so wish[.]”71 Over the last excruciating days, weeks, and months this 
harsh rhetoric, uttered by Duterte during his State of the Nation 
address on July 25, 2016, has served as the impetus for incredible 
violence committed by the Philippine state towards thousands of its 
citizens. 
Drugs are undoubtedly a scourge. They strip the body of its 
health, as well as the mind of its cognitive function. Drugs tear 
families apart, and are the cause of a significant percentage of the 
world’s violent crime. The people of the Philippines have 
undoubtedly experienced the many deleterious effects associated with 
the abuse of drugs. However, despite President Duterte’s ardent 
beliefs to the contrary, the answer to this dilemma is not to confront 
one human tragedy with another. 
As outlined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the ICCPR, every individual is entitled to the basic precepts of 
due process, including a right to not be summarily shot in the streets 
by roving gangs of police and vigilantes. When those due process 
rights are unilaterally denied by an overzealous executive, it is the 
duty of the international community to respond in such a way as to 
                                                 
necessary in order to maintain or restore the international peace and security. U.N. 
Charter, art. 51. 
 71 McKirdy, supra note 4. 
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cease the violations, and bring about the restoration of those rights. 
The first step in this process should be an attempt to arbitrate or 
mediate with Duterte, through means which may coerce Duterte into 
sitting at the table. 
Should this measure fail, the international community should 
next seek to adjudicate the matter before the ICJ, which has the 
authority under the UN Charter to both adjudicate against Duterte’s 
actions as well as issue an advisory opinion detailing how Duterte is 
in the wrong. Additionally, the international community may also 
seek to adjudicate Duterte’s crimes against humanity before the ICC. 
Finally, should mediation, arbitration, and adjudication fail to 
achieve peace, the Security Council should intervene against 
Duterte’s antidrug campaign. In the case of the Philippines, the 
Security Council should seek, through means specified in the Charter 
of the United Nations, to put an end to the suffering of untold 
thousands of Filipinos, who have watched their loved ones be 
brutally gunned down in the streets and locked away in filthy, 
overcrowding jail cells. The violence in the Philippines is a human 
tragedy that continues to escalate, and Duterte must be stopped 
before more lives can be irreparably harmed by his naked aggression 
and wanton disregard for fundamental precepts of international law. 
